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Abstract. Network steganography conceals the transfer of sensitive information within
unobtrusive data in computer networks. So-called micro protocols are communication protocols
placed within the payload of a network steganographic transfer. They enrich this transfer with
features such as reliability, dynamic overlay routing, or performance optimization — just to
mention a few. We present different design approaches for the embedding of hidden channels
with micro protocols in digitized audio signals under consideration of different requirements.
On the basis of experimental results, our design approaches are compared, and introduced into
a protocol engineering approach for micro protocols.
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1 Introduction
Network steganography is the art and science of transferring secret information over a net-
work while the hidden transfer itself is concealed. Network steganography is applied when
the encryption of secret data is not sufficient [32]. For instance, journalists can use network
steganography to keep the transfer of illicit information hidden when facing Internet censorship.
In addition to the transfer of hidden payload, so-called micro protocols (or control protocols)
can be embedded into a network steganographic communication. Micro protocols enrich the
feature-set of the steganographic channel in various aspects [28], such as
• adapting the steganographic channel’s configuration automatically to bypass new Internet
censorship infrastructure,
• integrate functionality for reliability and segmentation of hidden data, or
• provide dynamic overlay routing and optimization for the stealthiness of a hidden trans-
mission.
Being steganographic payload itself, a poor micro protocol design and placement can lead to
a higher detectability of a steganographic communication. This problem led to the development
of protocol engineering methods for micro protocols by Wendzel, Keller and Backs in [28, 2, 27].
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These protocol engineering methods either minimize the size of the micro protocol or the
placement within a structured carrier (machine readable, such as protocol header fields) but
not the placement within an unstructured carrier (understandable by humans, such as audio
content in audio or video transmissions).
Our work presents the first design approaches, evaluation and protocol engineering approach
for micro protocols to be placed in unstructured carriers. We demonstrate our approach on
the basis of digital audio transmissions.
Micro protocols comprise their own protocol headers. These headers can be designed in two
ways, either in form of a
1. static header, i.e., the whole header is present in one chunk, or in form of a
2. dynamic header, i.e. the header can be split into separate parts which are included on
demand and spread over the carrier.
For our micro protocol design, we consider both static and dynamic headers. Moreover, our
work examines how micro protocols must be designed to provide a high level of covertness
(stealthiness) in unstructured carriers. For the application of micro protocols to hidden data
within audio streams criteria like covertness, capacity and robustness of the transmitted data
are considered with respect to the specific conditions of a transmission of audio data and the
human auditive perception.
The reminder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains fundamentals of
related topics and discusses related work on micro protocols. In Section 3, we perform the
requirements analysis for our micro protocol engineering approach, followed by Section 4 in
which we discuss the implementation of the approach. Section 5 evaluates our work on the basis
of experiments. On the basis of this evaluation, Section 6 presents our protocol engineering
approach. Section 7 concludes and discusses future work.
2 Fundamentals
In this section, we first introduce basics of network steganography and related topics which
are of importance for this paper. We finish with an introduction to micro protocols and a
discussion of related work.
2.1 Steganography and Its Detection
The goals of a steganographic transfer can vary from the theft of confidential data, e.g., within
industrial espionage, over the hidden communication of command and control data in botnets,
to the transmission of illicit information by journalists [32]. Steganography dates back to
ancient Greece. Early approaches for steganography included the hiding of information using
e.g. an invisible ink. In the late 20th century, digital media steganography arose, which focuses
on hiding information in digital audio, image, and video files [33].
In digital audio steganography, confidential data is embedded into digital sound. Therefore,
bit sequences of the digital audio files are slightly changed to encode hidden data. This em-
bedding of data into audio files is especially challenging since the human auditive perception is
highly sensitive, in particular even more sensitive than the human visual system [3]. Research
focuses on the development of suitable technologies to prevent the perception of the stegano-
graphic data in audio files by both, humans and machines. In [13], some of the most widely
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used algorithms for audio steganography are discussed, which are LSB (Least Significant Bit)
Coding, Phase Coding, Parity Coding, Spread Spectrum and Echo Data Hiding. Transferring
hidden data in audio data shares some aspects with audio watermarking (cf. e.g. [15]), such
as close to no influence on perception by humans, and survival of operations like filtering.
The difference is that audio watermarks are not necessarily hidden data, and that they are
contempt if enough data from the watermark remains to identify the watermark, while enough
of the hidden data (including error-correcting code) must remain in order to completely and
correctly decode the payload.
Network steganography stealthily transfers arbitrary data over a network. Therefore, either
structured or unstructured carriers can be used. Structured data are those interpretable by
machines, having a pre-defined structure, such as a network protocol header, while unstructured
data is interpretable by a human, e.g. the content of an audio stream, an image file or a natural
language [6]. For instance, if data is hidden within the IPv4 TTL field, it is hidden in structured
data because protocol headers always have a pre-defined, machine-interpretable structure. The
embedding of hidden data in inaudible parts of audio streams, on the other hand, is a form of
network steganography in unstructured data.
From the audio steganography perspective, many methods (both for data hiding as well
as for their detection) have been designed and investigated e.g. for services like VoIP (Voice
over IP). As in this paper we investigate micro protocols for VoIP-like service that utilize the
LSB algorithm as an underlying steganographic method thus below we review related work
that describes LSB-based solutions and their detection. Currently, a lot of research effort
is still devoted for improving LSB steganography for real-time services like VoIP. The first
VoIP steganographic method to utilize the digital voice signal as a hidden data carrier was
proposed by Aoki in [1]. The LSB steganography was utilized to provide a PLC (Packet Loss
Concealment) method for G.711-based VoIP. Dittmann et al. in 2005 presented the first VoIP
steganography implementation prototype that also used the LSB method [5]. Wu and Yang
described the scheme of adaptive LSB [29], which for G.711-based speech calculates energy
statistics to estimate the number of least significant bits to be utilized as a hidden data carrier
in each voice sample. The results proved that this approach performs better than simple LSB
and offers a higher steganographic bandwidth (about 20 kbit/s) while introducing less degra-
dation of the voice quality. Wang and Wu also suggested using the least significant bits of voice
samples to carry secret communication [26], but in their solution the bits of the steganogram
were coded using a low rate voice codec, like Speex. Their prototype implementation is char-
acterized by a small processing delay of about 0.257 ms. Takahashi and Lee presented a proof
of concept LSB-based implementation, Voice over VoIP (Vo2IP), which is able to establish
a hidden communication by embedding 8 kbit/s G.729-based compressed voice data into the
regular PCM (Pulse Code Modulation)-based voice traffic [21]. In 2008 Liu et al. found that
the LSBs of each speech frame for G.729 can be replaced with secret data bits [18]. The
experimental results indicate that the method is perceptually transparent while the stegano-
graphic bandwidth is relatively high (about 200 bit/s). Tian et al. proposed the use of an LSB
steganography-based system that employs a well-balanced and simple encryption of secret data
[23]. This system was evaluated for VoIP with G.729a speech coding using a proof of concept
tool named StegTalk. The experimental results showed that the achievable steganographic
bandwidth is in the range 0.82.6 kbit/s and has a negligible effect on speech quality. Moreover,
it met the real-time requirements of the VoIP service. A real-time steganography system for
VoIP was described by Tian et al. in [24]. The main novelty of the proposed solution is not in
the steganographic method used (LSB), but in utilizing M-sequence encryption techniques to
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eliminate the correlation amongst secret messages to increase the resistance against statistical
steganalysis. Moreover, protocol steganography (usage of free/unused fields in protocols head-
ers) is applied to provide a novel synchronization mechanism together with an RSA-based key
agreement that ensures accurate restitution of the secret messages on the receiver side. This
system was experimentally evaluated for 0.8 and 2.6 kbit/s steganographic bandwidth, which
obtained a 0.3 and 1 quality drop in the MOS (Mean Opinion Score) scale (which is typically
used for expressing the quality of VoIP calls), respectively and the total embedding latency
increased by about 4.7 ms when 1 MB of steganogram is transmitted. In 2009 Xu and Yang
proposed an LSB-based method dedicated to voice transmission using the G.723.1 codec in 5.3
kbit/s mode [31]. They identified five least significant bits of the LSP VQ (Line Spectrum Pair
Vector Quantization) indices and used them to transmit hidden data; the method provided
a steganographic bandwidth of 133.3 bit/s. An insightful overview of the general techniques
that can be applied to VoIP steganography methods to make their detection even more dif-
ficult was introduced by Tian et al. in [22]. Additionally, they proposed three new encoding
strategies based on digital logic. All techniques were evaluated for LSB-based steganography
and proved to be effective. Another adaptive LSB-based steganography approach named AVIS
(Adaptive VoIP Steganography) was proposed by Xu et al. [30]. AVIS has two components:
VAMI (Value-based Multiple Insertion), which is responsible for dynamically selecting multiple
bits based on the VoIP vector value and VADDI (Voice Activity Detection Dynamic Insertion),
which dynamically changes the embedding intervals to make detection harder. The approach
was implemented for G.711-based VoIP and the results prove that it is less detectable than a
classic LSB method whilst achieving a steganographic bandwidth of about 114 B/s, introduc-
ing acceptable delay and degrading the voice from 0.1 to 0.4 on MOS scale. Finally, Liu et
al. adopted least-significant-digits rather than LSBs to hide secret data [17]. This approach
can increase around 30% of steganographic bandwidth while introducing lower steganographic
cost than classic LSB method.
From the covert communication detection perspective statistical steganalysis for LSB-based
VoIP steganography was first proposed by Dittmann et al. [5]. They proved that it was possible
to detect hidden communication with almost a 99% success rate under the assumption that
there are no packet losses and the steganogram is unencrypted/uncompressed. Takahasi and
Lee described a detection method based on calculating the distances between each audio signal
and its de-noised residual by using different audio quality metrics [21]. Then, a SVM classifier
is utilized for detection of the existence of hidden data. This scheme was tested on LSB,
DSSS, FHSSS and Echo hiding methods and the results obtained show that for the first three
algorithms the detection rate was about 94% and for the last it was about 73%. A Mel-
Cepstrum based detection, known from speaker and speech recognition, was introduced by
Kraetzer and Dittmann [16] for the purpose of VoIP audio steganalysis. Under the assumption
that a steganographic message is not permanently embedded from the start to the end of the
conversation, the authors demonstrated that the detection of an LSB-based steganography is
efficient with a success rate of 100%. Steganalysis of LSB steganography based on a sliding
window mechanism and an improved variant of the previously known Regular Singular (RS)
algorithm was proposed by Huang et al. [11]. Their approach provides a 64% decrease in the
detection time over the classic RS, which makes it suitable for VoIP. Moreover, experimental
results prove that this solution is able to detect up to five simultaneous VoIP covert channels
with a 100% success rate. Huang et al. also introduced the steganalysis method for compressed
VoIP speech that is based on second order statistics [10]. In order to estimate the length of
the hidden message, the authors proposed to embed hidden data into a sampled speech at
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a fixed embedding rate, followed by embedding other information at a different level of data
embedding. Experimental results showed that this solution not only allows the detection of
hidden data embedded in a compressed VoIP call, but also to accurately estimate its size.
Hanspach and Goetz present another acoustic covert channel that uses near-ultrasonic sound
from a laptop speaker to another laptop’s microphone to transfer data [9]. In their work,
the acoustic signals themselves shall be unnoticed, while our research addresses hiding of
information in digitized acoustic signals, which themselves are not hidden.
In general, steganographic traffic with micro protocols and without micro protocols can both
be detected the same way. However, there is work on micro protocol-specific countermeasures
that was published by Kaur et al. [14]. The authors demonstrate different active and passive
attacks on two micro protocols, including attacks on dynamic overlay routing and sniffing
attacks. Especially, if designed naively micro protocols can impact covertness negatively.
2.2 Micro Protocols and Related Work
Micro protocols (also covert channel control protocols or steganographic control protocols) are
protocols featuring headers, which are placed into a steganographic carrier. In other words,
they are part of the hidden data transferred in a steganographic transmission and share the
available space with the hidden payload of the transmission.
A number of micro protocols exist, which are surveyed and compared in [28]. The provided
features of micro protocols differ highly, for instance, [25] presents a micro protocol with
application layer functionality that provides a file transfer service, while [2] presents a dynamic
routing protocol for steganographic overlay networks. Other common features are to provide
reliability for the transfer of steganographic payload or to alternate between different hiding
methods on demand to overcome filtering technology in censorship environments.
As micro protocols share the usually limited space within a steganographic carrier with the
actual payload, two requirements arise [28]:
1. The micro protocol header must be as small as possible so that more payload can be
transferred per packet as the covertness of a connection increases when less hidden data
must be transferred.
2. The micro protocol header must be embedded into the steganographic carrier in a way
that its placement is always conforming to the carrier. Otherwise, the micro protocol may
cause unusual states in the carrier (e.g. unusual flag combinations of headers), resulting
in lower covertness.
Only two micro protocol engineering approaches exist and both focus on different goals.
Backs et al. address the first requirement of a minimized header size in [2]. For this reason,
they introduce a dynamic micro protocol header based on the concept of status updates. Each
header component of the micro protocol is only embedded on demand to reduce the overall size.
If a header component indicating a ‘state’, such as the destination of the attached payload, does
not change, the header component indicating the state is not required to be sent again until
its state changes. In other words, a status update is performed only on demand. Moreover,
the micro protocol header can be fragmented into an arbitrary number of pieces.
The second approach, which consists of six steps, was presented by Wendzel and Keller in
[27] and addresses the second requirement: it maximizes the covertness of the micro protocol’s
placement and behavior. Their approach focuses solely on structured carriers, namely network
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protocol headers. The ocurrence rates of bits in the micro protocol and bits of the carrier are
mapped in a way that the placement of the micro protocol causes as few anomalies as possible.
In [28], the approach was optimized in order to reflect bit mappings based on protocol states.
For instance, bit mappings of a micro protocol can depend on the state of a TCP connection
if embedded into TCP.
Moreover, the carrier and the micro protocol can each be described in form of a formal
grammar [27]. Using a language inclusion test, Wendzel and Keller verify whether the micro
protocol’s design is conforming to the design of the carrier. For example, some bits of carrier
headers can only occur at specific phases of a connection and not at the same time as other
bits. If the micro protocol violates such rules, the resulting anormal carrier behavior would
rise suspicion.
The only micro protocol that partly embeds into unstructured network data was presented
by Mazurczyk and Kotulski in [19] but embeds major information into a structured part of the
RTP header and provides no micro protocol engineering approach.
Thus, while Backs et al. reduce the size of the micro protocol, Wendzel and Keller optimize
the design and embedding of the protocol for structured carriers. No approach is available
for the optimal design and placement of micro protocols into unstructured carriers, which is
subject of this work.
3 Requirements Analysis
In this section, we will first introduce the requirements for the embedding of a micro protocol
into audio streams. We describe the implementation details in the following section. Based on
our evaluation, we will conduct the actual micro protocol engineering approach for unstructured
carriers. The implementation and evaluation are a necessity as no evaluation for the embedding
of different micro protocol designs in unstructured carriers exists.
Basic requirements for the embedding of a micro protocol are the non-functional requirements
of maximized covertness, robustness against changes, high channel capacity and a low overhead
of the steganographic transmission.
We achieve a high covertness by a space-efficient header design: the fewer bits must be
hidden, the smaller the influence on the utilized carrier. Therefore, our micro protocol engi-
neering approach must result in a space-optimized protocol design. For this reason, we apply
the concept of the aforementioned status updates.
For the receiver, it must be possible to extract the hidden information of network packets
at any time. Two different ways exist to embed a micro protocol into an unstructured carrier:
1. Fixed embedding: the micro protocol header is placed at a fixed position within the audio
data.
2. Dynamic embedding: the first bits of the micro protocol header are placed at a fixed
position within the audio data. These first bits indicate the placement of the following
micro protocol header components within the same packet. In this scenario, the micro
protocol header can be split into abitrary parts.
In both cases, the receiver must know the position and length of (the first part of) the
embedded micro protocol header. We decided to implement both approaches to enable their
comparison. Moreover, the micro protocol receiver must be capable to detect whether a micro
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protocol is present in a received network packet, or not. For this reason, our approach requires
the continuous sending of dummy data in every network packet to indicate the presence of a
micro protocol.
We have chosen the simple LSB algorithm, which hides data in least significant bits, for the
implementation of our proof of concept system. We used LSB as our work does not focus on
the hiding algorithm of the covert data but on the design and placement of the micro protocol
itself. Hence, in a real implementation an algorithm would be used that is better suited against
steganalysis but provides a similar quality, i.e. does not detoriate the audio quality notably.
4 Implementation
This section describes the micro protocol header design. The design is implemented in our
proof of concept system and is evaluated in the following section.
The design of a micro protocol header can be performed in two ways. Either, the whole micro
protocol header is transferred within a single network packet (refered to as a static design). Or,
the micro protocol is split over multiple packets were the earlier packets indicate that micro
protocol header parts follow with the next packet (refered to as dynamic design). We implement
both design approaches in order to compare them and implemented them additionally using
fixed embedding (see previous section). The combination of these design and embedding
approaches allows a highly dynamic header structure and embedding.
We decided to implement a status update-based micro protocol header consisting of at-
tributes. Each micro protocol header starts with an attribute called header type (HT) that
defines the structure of the remaining header.
4.1 Design of a Static Micro Protocol Header
Static headers comprise the advantage of a clear structure. On the other hand, static headers
cannot be split over different network packets and they may comprise header components which
are not required in every transferred packet. We defined the following four header types for a
generic, static micro protocol header:
1. REQ: a packet that initiates a request (incl. following data packets of a request),
2. DAT: a data packet containing payload,
3. RES: a response packet, containing no data as, in our model, responses only indicate
whether a request was successful (ACK) or not (ERR), and
4. DMY: a dummy type to indicate the presence of a micro protocol without content.
The header type (HT) is followed by a number of other attributes as shown in Tab. 1, that
also defines which attribute is included in each header type. The attributes are defined as
follows:
• NHO: an offset indicating the start of the next header attribute within the following
packet,
• FMT: specification of the data format in a request (ASCII plaintext or binary data),1
1Responses do not contain payload (DAT) but the bi-directional communication allows every peer to transfer
REQ packets containing payload.
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HT header type 2 REQ request 00 •
DAT data 01 •
RES response 10 •
DMY dummy 11 •
NHO next header offset 5 00000. . .11111 • • • •
FMT data format 1 textual data 0 •
binary data 1 •
CNT packet count 6 000000. . .111111 •
VER protocol version 2 01-11 •
LEN data length 8 0000. . .1111 •
CMD command 2 OK 00 •
RESEND 01 •
DMY dummy data 9 OK 9 random bits •
Table 1: Structure of our static micro protocol header
NHO
n bytes
Audio HT
2 bit 5 bit
FMT
1 
CNT
6 bit
VER
2 bit
Audio
n bytes
Figure 1: Example for a request using our static micro protocol header.
• CNT: counter for data packets (DAT header type),
• VER: version of the micro protocol used (only dynamic header),
• LEN: the length of attached data (only dynamic header),
• CMD: specifies a command (‘OK’ or ‘RESEND’) to indicate the need of a re-transmission,
and
• DMY: indicating 9 bits of dummy data.
Fig. 1 visualizes a sample packet for a static micro protocol header that is of the header type
‘request’. The whole header is embedded into the audio data transferred over the network.
The header type starts at a fixed position (fixed embedding) and indicates a request (REQ),
which is followed by the next header offset, the format bit, and the micro protocol’s version
number.
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HT header type 3 REQ request 000 •
RES response 001 •
DMY dummy 010 •
DAT data 011 •
LEN data length 100 •
NHO next header offset (optional) 101 •
FMT data format (optional) 110 •
VER protocol version (optional) 111 •
VAL value 1. . .n allows to transfer payload • • •
Table 2: Structure of our dynamic micro protocol header
n bytes
Audio Audio
n bytes
HT 
3 bit
VAL(depends on HT)
1...5 bit
n bits for HT=DAT
Figure 2: Visualization of the general structure of a dynamic micro protocol header. Each
packet contains only one header type (HT), i.e. no ‘pointer’ to the start of next HT
is required.
4.2 Design of a Dynamic Micro Protocol Header
Dynamic header designs allow to split headers into an abitrary number of data chunks. These
data chunks can be embedded at different locations of an audio payload. While dynamic
header designs result in higher implementation cost they also require the re-structuring of our
previously introduced static header. We apply the same attribute types as for the static header
but most of these attribute types are now header types (Tab. 2).
We distinguish between primary and secondary header types. Primary header types indicate
the overall meaning of a header (request, response or dummy data) while secondary header
types depend on the primary header types. Secondary header types add additional attributes
to the primary header type. In other words, secondary header types fullfil the same role as
attributes in the static header design but they can now be included on demand and split over
multiple locations within the audio carrier (by using their header type value to indicate their
presence).
All secondary header types are only included if a request is sent which results in smaller
response and dummy messages. Requests are additionally shrinked in size by defining rarely
used secondary header types as optional (indicated by the header type, see Tab. 2). In com-
parison to the static header, DAT was replaced by a value field (VAL) of dynamic size that can
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LEN 16
DAT
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REQ 1
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embedded data
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NHOAudio HT FMT CNT VER Audio
NHOAudio HT LEN
NHOAudio HT LEN
Audio HT Dummy Data AudioNHO
NHOAudio HT CMD Audio
Audio HT DD AudioNHO
Audio AudioHT VAL
Audio AudioHT VAL
Audio AudioHT VAL
Audio AudioHT VAL
Audio AudioHT
Audio AudioHT
Audio AudioHT VAL
Audio AudioHT VAL
Audio AudioHT VAL
VAL
VAL
Audio AudioHT VAL
Audio AudioHT VAL
Figure 3: Comparison of static and dynamic micro protocol header designs.
indicate both, payload and the parameters for header fields, such as a length value for LEN
or a version number for VER. The general structure of our dynamic header design is shown in
Fig. 2.
The start and the end of a transmission is signaled via request headers as Begin-of-Message
(BOM) and End-of-Message (EOM) headers. The former is indicated by HT=REQ, VAL=0
and the latter is indicated by HT=REQ, VAL=1.
We visually compare both design concepts, the static and the dynamic header, in Fig. 3.
5 Evaluation
We now evaluate the implementation of both the static and the dynamic micro protocol design.
These results will serve as a basis for the design of our micro protocol engineering approach
for unstructured carriers.
For evaluation purposes we chose to emulate an audio streaming service like VoIP by stream-
ing a predetermined 5-minutes long .wav file. It contains audio recordings from the TIMIT [7]
continuous speech corpus which is one of the most widely used corpora in the speech recog-
nition community. Both male and female voices speaking English were used. During the
experiments, parts of the .wav input file were then inserted into the payloads of consecutive
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RTP packets and sent to the receiver where reassembling into a .wav file was performed. Then,
the original and degraded files were compared with the use of PESQ (Perceptual Evaluation of
Speech Quality) [12] and the resultant MOS-LQO (Mean Opinion Squared-Listening Quality
Objective) was returned.
We compared the transmission of hidden data using both micro protocol designs with the
same payload sizes for different variations of the LSB algorithm and different audio codecs.
For both the static and the dynamic header design we performed transmissions with varying
header structures and varying frequencies at which packets were sent. For this reason, we
implemented three scenarios:
1. A transmission of dummy packets with 16 bit payload.
2. A transmission using a packet loop, each consisting of dummy packets, one REQ, few
DAT and one RES packet. We sent requests with 3x480 bit payload. As shown in Fig. 3,
it was necessary to add additional packets to the dynamic header, namely for the header
types NHO, LEN, FMT, and VER.
3. A transmission using one REQ packet followed by as many DAT packets as feasible per
request and header design.
All requests were acknowledged with response packets in order to perform a bi-directional
transmission. In detail each test scenario works as follows: First, the original PCM file will
be read out. Second, the transmitter converts the file to the defined payload type and the
transmitted bytes are recorded as raw bytes into a separate file. Third, the receiver reads the
stream and decodes the embedded message if included. Fourth, the stream is saved in a .wav
file. Fifth, streams with embedded messages and streams without embedded messages will be
compared regarding changes at the bit level and their audio quality.
We compare the MSE (Mean Squared Error), SNR (Signal-to-Noise Ratio), PNSR (Peak
Signal-to-Noise Ratio), and MOS-LQO (Mean Opinion Score-Listening Quality Objective) of
our proof-of-concept implementation to evaluate the differences between audio transmissions
without steganographic content and those with steganographic content.
Fig. 4 shows our experimental setup. Two hosts are communicating over a covert channel
and the receiver provides feedback about the received steganographic data back to the sender.
We applied the audio codecs ULAW and DVI; all transmissions are performed using the RTP
protocol.
5.1 Static Header Design
The results for the evaluation of our static header design are shown in Tab. 3, which shows
the MSE, SNR, PSNR and MOS-LQO values for different codecs and algorithms. Increasing
the amount of embedded data results in a lower covertness, in a lower Mean Opinion Score
and needs fewer packets with embedded payload per transaction. Tab. 3 also reveals the
insufficient performance for the MSB and LSB6Enh algorithms (the latter is utilizing the sixth
least significant bit). We can conclude that changes of higher significant bits result, as expected,
in a higher reduction of the voice quality when a static micro protocol is embedded. Fig. 5
additionally visualizes the Signal-to-Noise Ratio, Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio, and MOS values
for the static micro protocol header case depending on the embedding algorithm used, codec
and utilized embedding capacity.
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Figure 4: Experimental setup for the evaluation of our micro protocol designs.
5.2 Dynamic Header Design
The results for our experiments using the dynamic header are shown in Tab. 4. Due to
the additional header types (HT), the dynamic header consumes more space than the static
header in case of small payload transfers. In other words, our highly fragmented header design
produces an overhead of header data in comparison to the static header. For this reason,
the dynamic header leaves slightly less space for the embedding of hidden payload2 and the
average embedding capacity for our test cases was higher in case of static headers (6.383%)
as for dynamic headers (5.188%). However, if large payload is transferred, the overhead of
the dynamic header is smaller than the overhead of the static header and thus provides better
capacity. The MOS results are better in case of the dynamic header (in average 3.119 for
dynamic header and 2.812 for the static header).
Fig. 6 visualizes the Signal-to-Noise Ratio, Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio and MOS values for
the dynamic micro protocol header depending on the embedding algorithm, codec and utilized
embedding capacity.
6 Micro Protocol Engineering
Based on the results conducted in the previous experiments, we now derive recommendations
for the design of micro protocols in unstructured carriers. We afterwards present our micro
protocol engineering approach.
6.1 General Recommendations
Even small changes in audio transmissions can lead to the acoustic identification of quality
reduction.3 At the same time, the embedding of larger amounts of data per packet without
2Backs et al. provide another dynamic header approach that provides slightly better results than a static
header [2]. Their header design provides only few fragments and thus decreases the overhead in comparison
to a static header.
3Regarding to Dickreiter et al., humans are able to recognize a voice inside a noised signal with a Signal-to-Noise
Ratio of 6dB [4].
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Codec Algorithm Hidden Bits MSE SNR (dB) PSNR (dB) MOS-LQO
ULAW none (reference) 0% 4.25
(8Khz, 8bit, LSB1 0.417% 0.017 63.881 65.861 4.080
mono) 3.853% 0.155 54,240 56.220 3.285
11.847% 0.478 48.357 51.339 2.577
LSB2 0.417% 0.057 58.554 60.543 4.099
7.219% 0.918 46.509 48.505 3.054
23.094% 2.952 41.398 43.429 2.720
MSB 0.417% 289.717 21.490 23.511 2.801
3.853% 2581.209 11.714 14.013 1.687
11.847% 7914.764 6.149 9.146 1.332
LSB6Enh 0.417% 15484 34.239 36.232 3.501
3.845% 135.814 24.713 26.801 2.938
11.847% 412.661 19.661 21.975 2.523
DVI none (reference) 0% 3.85
(11Khz, 4bit, LSB1 0.410% 0.016 59.927 66.226 3.847
mono) 4.123% 0.163 49.697 55.996 2.978
11.833% 0.473 45.082 51.382 2.678
LSB2 0.820% 0.071 53.318 59.617 3.101
6.213% 0.517 44.686 50.995 1.951
18.799% 1.548 39.899 46.232 1.457
Table 3: Evaluation results for a static micro protocol header design.
raising attention is difficult in highly compressed audio transmissions. A first recommendation
is therefore that implementations of micro protocols should allow the selection of particular
codecs on startup, depending on the amount of data to be transferred and other considerations
such as time limits.
Our following recommendations are related to requirements, namely covertness, channel
capacity, and reliability. Indeed, these requirements result in a multi-criteria optimization
problem, as a higher channel capacity results in lower covertness, and may also influence
reliability.
Maximizing Covertness An alternating offset for the initial ‘header type’ field of the micro
protocol header increases the hurdles for a warden to recognize patterns of steganographic
transmissions and with it the hidden communication itself. We also recommend the intro-
duction of dummy data packets (as forseen in our protocol designs). These dummy data are
exchanged between hosts when no actual steganographic payload must be transferred. If no
dummy data are transferred, the difference between actual steganographic transfers and audio
transfers without steganographic content will be larger and thus may rise more suspicion. A
small micro protocol header contributes additionally to the covertness and must be seen as a
central element in any micro protocol engineering approach. We recommend the implementa-
tion of dynamic headers as these result in a higher covertness.
Maximizing Capacity Codecs with lower compression allow the integration of more hidden
data. Like in case of a maximized covertness, a small micro protocol header can contribute
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Figure 5: Comparison of experimental results for the static micro protocol design.
to a maximized capacity, too: the fewer space is required for embedding the header, the more
space is left for embedding hidden payload. Advanced techniques for the embedding of audio
steganography, such as Transcoding Steganography (TranSteg) [20], can be applied to increase
the channel capacity. Moreover, a covert channel can utilize structured and non-structured
elements of network packets simultaneously. For larger payloads, the covertness of the dynamic
header provides better results and is recommended for this reason. For small payload transfers,
the overhead of the dynamic header results in lower capacity than the static header approach.
For this reason, the protocol engineer must decide – based on the particular use case of the
micro protocol – which approach to chose if the capacity must be optimized.
Reliability In case of real-time streaming, the loss of audio packets occurs on a regular basis.
If audio packets are lost, their steganographic content is lost as well. For this reason, we
recommend the implementation of reliability mechanisms, such as ARQ (Automatic Repeat
reQuest) or more advanced techniques. It is also imaginable to implement reliability not on a
per-packet basis but instead on a per-n-packet basis, e.g. for every 10 packets. This heavily
reduces the required number of acknowledgement messages.
Of course, knowledge about the reliability mechanism used can also be exploited to detect
that the covert communication is taking place e.g. by intentionally introducing packet losses in
order to observe and to correlate the responses. In such a case a more sophisticated reliability
approach can be utilized as proposed e.g. by Hamdaqa and Tahvildari [8] which can be easily
incorporated for audio steganography purposes. It provides a reliability and fault tolerance
mechanism based on a modified (k, n) threshold using Lagrange Interpolation and their results
demonstrate that the complexity of steganalysis is increased.
6.2 Micro Protocol Engineering Approach
While Section 3 discussed the requirements of our micro protocol implementation, we now
present the requirements of our micro protocol engineering approach. The micro protocol
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Codec Algorithm Hidden Bits MSE SNR (dB) PSNR (dB) MOS-LQO
ULAW none (reference) 0% 4.25
(8Khz, 8bit, LSB1 0.208% 0.008 66.896 68.875 4.242
mono) 2.457% 0.100 56,133 58.113 3.429
11.549% 0.469 49.437 51.420 2.636
LSB2 0.208% 0.025 62.234 64.214 4.248
4.704% 0.602 48.348 50.338 3.290
22.785% 2.915 41.454 43.484 2.722
MSB 0.208% 143.555 24.562 26.561 3.327
2.457% 1674.369 13.712 15.892 1.946
11.549% 7777.446 6.244 9.222 1.343
LSB6Enh 0.208% 7.583 37.347 39.333 3.805
2.457% 87.970 26.639 28.687 3.092
11.549% 405.232 19.746 22.054 2.537
DVI none (reference) 0% 3.85
(11Khz, 4bit, LSB1 0.410% 0.016 59.914 66.213 3.847
mono) 1.690% 0.069 53.475 59.773 3.567
6.918% 0.280 47.362 53.661 3.302
LSB2 0.410% 0.029 57.264 63.562 3.439
2.526% 0.209 48.627 54.930 2.885
11.093% 0.918 42.185 48.504 2.494
Table 4: Evaluation results for a dynamic micro protocol header design.
engineering approach is based on a typical use case for which a micro protocol design will be
created. The output of the micro protocol engineering process is the micro protocol design.
In [27], Wendzel and Keller mention fundamental requirements of a micro protocol engineer-
ing approach, of which we consider the following two for our approach:
• The micro protocol engineering approach must be applicable in practice.
• The most important criterion to fulfill by the micro protocol is to provide a high covert-
ness. Therefore, the protocol engineering approach must support a maximized covertness
of the resulting micro protocol.
We extend these aspects with the following additional requirements:
• The micro protocol’s transmission must be reliable, i.e. possess a feedback channel or
another means for error correction.
• The micro protocol should be adaptable to different codecs used for the unstructured
carrier.
Based on these requirements, we derive a four-phase model for the micro protocol designing
process. We limit the required workload of the protocol engineer and design the particular
steps in a practically applicable manner. The model is shown in Fig. 7. A switch between the
phases is feasible at any time to optimize the micro protocol design.
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Figure 6: Comparison of experimental results for the dynamic micro protocol design.
First Phase In the first phase, a use case analysis must be performed. The use case anal-
ysis defines the requirements (e.g. high channel capacity) which are linked to that use case.
For instance, some micro protocols must be designed for high-throughput transmissions while
others may only need to transfer a few bits per second. A sample use case could be the trans-
fer of illicit video data over slow or non-reliable connections. Moreover, it must be defined
whether a real-time transmission or the transmission of data on-demand will be required and
which transmission media will be used. Finally, it must be defined whether the steganographic
transmission must be reliable.
Second Phase Based on the requirements definition in the first phase, the second phase
defines the network protocols, the media codecs, the compression algorithm used and the
steganographic embedding algorithms to be used. For instance, if the requirement is a real-
time transmission, the RTP protocol can serve as a network protocol.
If steganographic data is embedded into the audio data after the compression took place, the
hidden data may not be subjected to change during transmission. In such a case spatial-domain
methods such as Least Significant Bits (LSB) or adding information to silence sections of the
voice transmission can be applied. If changes of the steganographic content can be performed
within the transmission, it may be more suitable to select frequency-based methods such as
Phase Coding, Spread Spectrum, or Echo Data Hiding.
Finally, if reliability was defined as a requirement within the first phase, a means must
be defined to realize reliability, e.g. by adding sequence numbers and a TCP-like reliability
algorithm or more covert approaches like described in Section 6.1.
Third Phase First, the protocol engineer must determine the available space to place hidden
data into the unstructured carrier. The available space is a result of the audio codec used.
The resulting value is used as a limit for the size of the micro protocol header.
Secondly, the requirements for covertness and channel capacity must be addressed. As
discussed in Sect. 6.1, dynamic header designs can increase the covertness and – for larger
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Figure 7: Our phase model for the design of micro protocols in unstructured carriers.
payload – the capacity of a transmission while for small payload transactions, a static header
will provide a better capacity. After this decission is made, the required size for the micro
protocol header must be determined. All necessary features, such as the capability to transfer
dummy data or to provide reliability, must be integrated into the header (represented by single
or multiple bits as header fields). If the micro protocol consumes too much space, features
must either be reduced or the micro protocol must be designed in a more dynamic way. If
both actions are not feasible, a carrier that provides more space must be selected, which leads
back to the second phase.
Thirdly, the protocol engineer subtracts the micro protocol header size from the available
hidden storage space within the carrier. The result is the available space for the hidden payload
per packet. If the available space is insufficient to transfer the necessary number of bits per
second in the given use case, the engineer must re-design the micro protocol or must change
definitions within the second phase.
Fourthly, the protocol engineer must specifiy how the start of micro protocol data within
the carrier is indicated. This can be done by defining a fixed offset for the first packet and
defining sequences to identify data.4
Fifthly, the micro protocol must be implemented in a proof of concept system.
Fourth Phase Finally, the micro protocol design must be verified. For this reason, a proof
of concept code must be implemented and tested. Passive wardens, either as humans or as
4The larger the allowed next header offset values (header type NHO), the less space will be available per packet
(see third step).
17
software, should be used to assess the non-detectability of the covert communication. Moreover,
it must be evaluated whether the embedding of the steganographic data can result in behavior
that is not conforming to a codec’s specification. This last step includes ensuring that attributes
defined in the audio codec (e.g., the packet capacity, specified sampling rate, bit depth or needed
audio transformation steps) are not violated by the embedded micro protocol. A simple method
is to verify the correct processing of the modified streams by a common player software, e.g.
a streaming client.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
We demonstrated the embedding of a micro protocol into an unstructured carrier, namely audio
streaming over the network. The micro protocol was implemented in a static and a dynamic
way to compare the resulting performance and impact of both designs on the audio signal.
Based on this feasibility study and its evaluation, we developed a micro protocol engineering
approach for unstructured carriers. Our micro protocol engineering approach extends the
existing approaches which were solely focusing on structured carriers.
Micro protocols can be designed in a different way as proposed in this article, e.g. more
header functionality can be integrated and alternative audio codecs can be applied. However,
our discussed designs are highly dynamic and, for this reason, represent a generic design
approach that can easily be modified by introducing new or replacing present header types.
At the moment, our framework does not address the micro protocol’s temporal behavior.
However, the micro protocol’s temporal behavior should at least be adjusted closely to the
temporal behavior of the carrier (e.g. inter packet gaps) — otherwise its temporal behavior
may lead to detectability [14]. The micro protocol engineering framework will thus be extended
for this purpose.
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